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David P. Currie t
In November, 1980, in Joliet, Illinois, a car turned over and
caught fire. A policeman arrived and began directing traffic away
from the scene. He made no effort to determine whether or not
there were people in the car. There were, and they burned to
death. The city was sued for damages on the ground that, by fail-
ing to save the occupants, the policeman and therefore the city had
deprived them of life or liberty without due process of law.
Relief was denied. Our Constitution, wrote Judge Posner, "is a
charter of negative rather than positive liberties. . . . The men
who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that Government
might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to
them. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868 at the height
of laissez-faire thinking, sought to protect Americans from oppres-
sion by state government, not to secure them basic governmental
services." 1 Thus the city had no constitutional duty to help the
accident victims, and thus its failure to act deprived them of
neither liberty nor life.2
The question is important. If government has an affirmative
duty to help accident victims, it may have other positive duties as
well. It may have a duty to protect people against hostile acts of
third parties such as theft and murder. It may also have a duty to
protect them from hunger and disease. Judge Posner's broad de-
nial of the existence of "positive liberties" seems to reject any such
obligation. He is telling us, among other things, that there is no
constitutional right to welfare benefits.
The language of the constitutional provision seems to support
Judge Posner's conclusion. Like so many of the provisions of the
t Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. My thanks to the Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School, where the essence of this paper was delivered as the Wilber G.
Katz Memorial Lecture in November, 1985; to Erhard Denninger of the University of
Frankfurt, with whom I explored the issues here considered during a joint seminar on com-
parative constitutional law; and to Gerhard Casper, Barbara Flynn Currie, Phil C. Neal, and
Cass Sunstein for invaluable advice and encouragement.
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Bill of Rights, from which it was copied, the due process clause is
phrased as a prohibition, not an affirmative command:' "nor shall
any State" is the equivalent of "a State shall not." Moreover, what
the states are forbidden to do is to "deprive" people of certain
things, and depriving suggests aggressive state activity, not mere
failure to help. The contrast with provisions of the same document
imposing duties to conduct a census,4 to return fugitives, 5 and to
guarantee a republican form of governmentq-and with language in
other constitutions explicitly recognizing affirmative rights to vari-
ous social services 7-suggests that when constitution-makers im-
pose affirmative government obligations they tend to say so.
History, as Judge Posner says, also tends to support his con-
clusion. The ratification debates and the preamble to the resolu-
tion proposing the Bill of Rights contain repeated references con-
firming Madison's explanation that the Bill of Rights was designed
to protect against "abuse of the powers of the General Govern-
ment," and in particular to limit the powers of Congress." The
I The clause reads, "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
I Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States. . . according to their respective Numbers. . . . The actual Enumeration
shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress . . . and within
every subsequent Term of ten Years. .. ").
- Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 ("A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the
executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up. .. ").
6 Id. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion. .. .");
see also id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensa-
tion for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury.. ").
7 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION tit. Ier (France 1791) (quoted infra at text accompanying
note 17); CONSTITUTION preamble (France 1946) ("The Nation ensures to the individual and
the family the conditions necessary to their development" and "guarantees to all . ., pro-
tection of health [and] material security"; those "unable to work [have] the right to obtain
from the community the means to lead a decent existence."); VERFASSUNG DES DEUTCHEN
REIcHS arts. 119, 143, 145, 161, 163 (Weimar Republic, Ger. 1919) (enumerating rights to
education, national insurance, and employment or unemployment compensation); CONSTITU-
TION arts. 40, 42, 44-46 (U.S.S.R. 1977) (enumerating rights to employment, health protec-
tion, housing, education, and culture); cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217, U.N. Doc. A/Ill, art. 22 (1948) ("Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to
social security.. . ."); id. art. 23 ("the right to. . . protection against unemployment"); id.
art. 25 ("the right to a standard of living adequate for. . . health and well-being"); id. art.
26 ("the right to education").
8 See, e.g., 1 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 338 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) (Congres-
sional resolution explaining that several conventions had "expressed such a desire, in order
to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers"); 2 id. at 177 (Massachusetts resolution
proposing amendments to "guard against an undue administration of the federal govern-
ment"); 2 id. at 396-406 (Mr. Tredwell expressing fears of excessive federal power); 3 id. at
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Framers would have been astounded to hear it contended that by
adopting the Bill of Rights they had managed to make mandatory
the exercise of a Congressional power to help needy citizens when
the very existence of such a power was reasonably doubted as re-
cently as the 1930s-.1 And, given the absence of evidence in the de-
bates, it is hard to believe the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment was meant to have a radically different effect from
that of the fifth.10
Moreover, Supreme Court jurisprudence yields additional sup-
port for Judge Posner's thesis. The paucity of early decisions em-
ploying constitutional guarantees to compel governments to care
for needy citizens suggests something about the original under-
standing. The numerous decisions recognizing that the fourteenth
amendment limits only government and not private action suggest
a principle that cannot be avoided by rephrasing the complaint to
attack official failure to prevent private activity." More pointedly,
as Judge Posner noted, the recent decisions denying an obligation
to pay for abortions are squarely based upon his conception that
the due process clauses confer rights of protection from rather
than by the government: 12 "although government may not place
obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of
choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation."'13
461 (Mr. Henry articulating similar concerns); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 449-50, 454-55 (J. Gales
ed. 1789) (remarks by Mr. Madison).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-70 (1936) (finally rejecting the argu-
ment that the federal spending power was limited to that necessary to carry out other enu-
merated powers, but limiting conditional grants). Indeed, the ninth amendment seems to
have been adopted precisely to prevent using the Bill of Rights as the basis for a broad
construction of congressional powers. See DAvID CuRIUE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT-THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 48-49 (1985).
10 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1873) (Miller, J.) (equat-
ing the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment with those of the fifth).
" See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (the "wrongful act of an indi-
vidual, unsupported by any [state] authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that
individual").
12 See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir.) (citing Harris v.
MacRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1983), for the proposition that
the Constitution is a "charter of negative liberties."
23 Harris, 448 U.S. at 316. The Court added, "It cannot be that because government
may not prohibit the use of contraceptives,. . . or prevent parents from sending their child
to a private school,. . . government, therefore, has an affirmative constitutional obligation
to ensure that all persons have the financial resources to obtain contraceptives or to send
their children to private schools." Id. at 318 (citations omitted); accord Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 474 (1977) ("The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases, per-
haps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way af-
fected by the Connecticut regulation."). The dissenters in Harris did not rely on the argu-
ment that the government deprives a person of a right by not subsidizing its exercise, but on
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In the face of this array of powerful arguments supporting
Judge Posner's position, one might be tempted to dismiss a rather
noisy collection of contrary academic assertions as wishful think-
ing.1 An interesting series of decisions in West Germany, however,
finding affirmative government duties largely on the basis of provi-
sions phrased somewhat the same way as ours, suggests that Judge
Posner's conclusion may not be so obvious as it may seem. I shall
first discuss the German decisions and then take a closer look at
our own.
I. GERMAN DECISIONS
Anatole France's mockery of a law that forbade the rich as
well as the poor to sleep under bridges15 was representative of a
growing conviction that governments ought to start taking more
affirmative action to benefit the people. As early as 1758, Montes-
quieu had argued that the state "owed all citizens," among other
things, "nourishment, suitable clothing, and the opportunity for a
healthy life."' The French Constitution of 1791 acknowledged
such a duty by imposing an obligation on government to establish
not only a system of free public education but also a system of
public assistance "to bring up abandoned children, relieve poor in-
valids, and furnish work to the able-bodied poor who cannot ob-
tain it for themselves. ' '17
Of more direct relevance to the question of interpretation were
those who, instead of taking the position that liberty was not
the contention that by discriminating against abortions in the context of a program paying
for other services, the government had indeed placed obstacles in the way of obtaining an
abortion. Harris, 448 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). For a
similar argument see Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens and Benefits,
Hard Cases and Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 978, 1008-10 (1981).
Analogies from other fields of the law also support Judge Posner. In neither criminal
nor tort law are people generally held responsible for mere failure to help others. See, e.g.,
P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 373
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON] ("The highly individualistic philoso-
phy of the older common law had no great difficulty in working out restraints upon the
commission of affirmative acts of harm, but shrank from converting the courts into an
agency for forcing men to help one another.").
14 See, e.g., Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969); Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty,
1968 Sup. CT. REv. 199; Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CA. L. REV. 407
(1966). For a defense of the traditional contrary view see Bork, The Impossibility of Find-
ing Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695.
's ANATOLE FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE (1894).
14 2 BARON DE MONTrsQuiEu, ESPRIT DES Lois (V. Pritchard ed. 1898).
17 CONSrUTION tit. Ier. (France 1791) (author's translation).
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enough, undertook-to define the term itself to include positive gov-
ernment duties. The English philosopher Thomas Hill Green, for
example, emphatically denied that liberty consisted solely of the
absence of legal restraint, insisting that it was instead "the positive
power or capacity of doing or enjoying something," and thus that
affirmative government aid might be essential to liberty."'
There continued to be those who argued that, however justi-
fied the call for affirmative government action, this was a misuse of
the term "liberty." Isaiah Berlin, for example, pointed out that the
inability of humans to fly was not generally thought of as lack of
freedom."' In imposing a number of affirmative obligations on the
German government in 1919, the Weimar Constitution did so ex-
pressly and without referring to liberty or freedom.20 The influen-
tial German scholar Carl Schmitt, writing in 1928, was quick to
assert that such "socialistic" rights as these, for which he evidently
had little sympathy, were not what was meant by "basic rights" at
all. The latter consisted rather of defensive rights ("Abwehr-
rechte") assuring a "limited possibility of governmental intrusion":
"Basic rights in the true sense are therefore only rights of individ-
ual freedom, not social demands" on the state for the provision of
21services.
The current Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany,
adopted in 1949, differs in a great many respects from the Weimar
Constitution, not least in its omission of specific governmental du-
ties to provide such services as education, employment, and social
insurance. 2 Preserved and strengthened, on the other hand, is a
collection of "basic rights ' 23 that reads very much like the tradi-
tional catalogue of defensive rights described by Schmitt and by
Judge Posner. Every person has, for example, "the right to life. '24
18 THOMAS H. GREEN, Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in 3 WORKS 371
(R. Nettleship 3d ed. 1891) (arguing that some government limitations on freedom of con-
tract actually increased liberty).
" ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 7 (1958).
" VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN RmiCHs arts. 119, 143, 145, 161, 163 (Weimar Republic,
Ger. 1919).
21 CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 163-70 (1928). Schmitt's evident distaste for so-
cial rights was suggested not only by his disdainful use of the term "socialistic" but also by
his earlier flat statement that the goal of a modern constitution was "protection of the citi-
zen from the misuse of governmental power." Id. at 126.
11 There is one exception: "Every mother has a claim to the protection and support of
the community." GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 6, abs 4 (W. Ger.) (translation by the Press and
Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn).
13 GG art. 1, abs. 3.
24 Id. art. 2, abs. 2, § 1.
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The "liberty of the individual" 25 and "freedom of faith, of con-
science," and of "religious or ideological" creed are "inviolable. '26
Everyone has the "right freely to express and disseminate his opin-
ion,"'27 and all Germans have "the right freely to choose their
trade, occupation, or profession, their place of work and their place
of training." 25 The express provision that the rights listed are bind-
ing on all organs of government" seems to exclude any inference
that they also apply directly to the actions of private parties. The
social obligations of government seem to be summed up in the
cryptic and on its face merely descriptive statement that the Fed-
eral Republic "is a democratic and social federal state."3 0
It was against these provisions, on their face so similar to our
own, that the German Constitutional Court was called upon in
1975 to measure a statute regulating the right to abortion. The re-
sult, for the observer from the United States, was arresting. Our
Supreme Court, at about the same time, had held the due process
clause forbade the state generally to make abortion a crime. The
German court held that a similarly worded clause required it to do
SO.31
The first step in the German court's reasoning was to con-
clude, contrary to our Supreme Court, that the fetus was, in es-
sence, a person whose life was among those protected by the Basic
Law. 2 This conclusion alone, however, did not compel the decision
that the constitution required the state to punish abortion in gen-
eral. For many abortions are performed not by governments but by
private parties, and, as already noted, the right to life seemed to be
guaranteed, as it is in the United States, against government alone.
Without disputing this conclusion, the court focused upon the gov-
ernment's inaction and took the step that Judge Posner, and our
,3 Id. art. 2, abs. 2, § 2.
" Id. art. 4; abs. 1.
27 Id. art. 5, abs. 1, § 1.
" Id. art. 12, abs. 1, § 1.
29 Id. art. 20, abs. 3.
30 Id. art. 20, abs. 3, § 1. Article 28, abs. 1, § 1, makes the general social-state principle
binding on the individual states (Ldnder) that make up the Federation ("The constitutional
order in the Linder must conform to the principles of republican, democratic and social
government ... within the meaning of this Basic Law"), but most of the decisions dis-
cussed below involved actions of the central government.
" Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), with Entscheidungen des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts [BVerfG] 39, 1 (1975). An English translation of the German decision appears
at 9 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 551 (1976). American commentary on the decision includes
Kommers, Abortion and the Constitution: United States and West Germany, 225 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 255 (1977).
" BVerfGE 39, 20 (1975).
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Supreme Court in the abortion-funding cases, refused to take: it
interpreted a provision recognizing a right to life against govern-
ment as imposing an affirmative duty to protect life from menaces
not of the government's making. The Basic Law, the court de-
clared, not only "prohibits. . .direct governmental encroachments
upon the developing life, but also commands the State. . .to safe-
guard it from illegal encroachments by others."33
There were dissenting opinions, but not on this point; the only
disagreement was over whether criminal sanctions were the only
acceptable way for the state to carry out its affirmative obliga-
tion.3 4 The basic conclusion that the constitutional provision guar-
anteeing a right to life requires affirmative protection against third
parties is widely supported in the German literature,3 5 and it has
been confirmed in later decisions-although without finding addi-
tional cases in which existing law provided inadequate protection. 6
Other German decisions, moreover, have applied the same rea-
soning to find in similarly worded provisions government obliga-
tions to protect the individual not from third parties but from
what may appear to be adverse physical or economic conditions.
First, in 1960, in striking down a federal statute setting up a gov-
ernment-controlled television network, the constitutional court re-
lied in part upon the provision that "freedom of reporting by
means of broadcasts" was "guaranteed."37 This provision, the court
said, "contains more than just the citizen's right that the state re-
spect a sphere of freedom in which he can express his opinions
without hindrance."3 " Because both technical and economic factors
dictated that "in the broadcasting field the number of stations
must remain small,"3 "[b]roadcast stations must. . . be so organ-
ized that all interests worthy of consideration have an influence in
their governing councils and can express themselves in the overall
33 Id. at 42 (author's translation).
34 See id. at 69.
35 See, e.g., Denninger, Einleitung vor Art. 1, in KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 256-66 (1985); Schneider, Eigenart und Funktionen der
Grundrechte im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat, in JOACHIM PERELS, GRUNDRECHTE ALS
FUNDAMENT DER DEMOKRATIE 11, 40 (1979); KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZOGE DES VERFASSUNGS-
RECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 146-47 (12th ed. 1980).
36 See, e.g., BVerfG 46, 160, 162 (1977) (citizens are entitled to protection from ter-
rorists); BVerfG 49, 89, 142 (1978) (state has a duty under the Basic Law to regulate nuclear
emissions); BVerfG 53, 30 (1979) (state has a duty to regulate nuclear power plants);
BVerfG 56, 54, 63 (1981) (state has a duty to regulate airport noise).
37 GG art. 5, abs. 1.
3s BVerfG 12, 205, 259-60 (1960) (author's translation).
39 Id. at 261.
[53:864
Positive and Negative Rights
program. '40 Similarly, in 1972, the German court interpreted a
provision guaranteeing that "[a]ll Germans shall have the right
freely to choose . . . their place of training"'41 to impose a duty on
the state to provide schooling. "The constitutional protection of
basic rights in the field of education -is not limited to the protective
function against governmental intervention traditionally ascribed
to the basic rights. ' 42 Because "the right would be worthless with-
out the actual ability to make use of it," the entitlement "of every
German to carry out his chosen study program if he demonstrates
the requisite qualifications .. . is not in the discretion of the
lawmakers. 4 8 In short, the German court, in sharp contrast to the
view taken by Judge Posner and our abortion-funding cases, is
firmly committed to the view that an assortment of provisions
guaranteeing rights against government imposes affirmative gov-
ernmental duties to protect the citizen.
Differences in phrasing make these decisions somewhat easier
to justify under the German constitution than they would be under
our own. In the abortion case, for example, the court invoked not
only the right to life but also a provision making it the "duty of all
state authority" not only to "respect" but also to "protect" the
dignity of man.44 The "freedom" of broadcasting and the "right" to
choose a place of training are "guaranteed" or simply declared, not
merely protected against official abridgement.45 The social-state
principle may plausibly be read as a direction to interpret basic
rights in line with a more extensive understanding of the affirma-
tive obligations of government.48 Even if the language of the two
constitutions were the same, moreover, it would be arguable that
the different social and political climates in which they had been
adopted justified differing interpretations: James Madison and his
40 Id. at 262-63. A generation later, in warning that the government's obligation would
not disappear "even if in the course of modern development the special situation caused by
shortage of transmitting frequencies and by the high financial expenditure needed for
broadcasting productions no longer obtains," the court repeated that "it is a responsibility
incumbent on the legislature to see that there will be an overall offering in which the multi-
tude of opinions that is indispensable in a free democracy finds its expression." BVerfG 57,
295 (1981).
41 GG art. 1, abs. 1.
42 BVerfG 33, 303, 330 (1972).
43 Id. at 331. Later in the opinion, after saying all this, the court professed to leave the
question open. Id. at 333.
44 GG art. 1, abs. 1, § 1. See BVerfG 39, 41 (1975); Denninger, Verfassungsrechtliche
Schlisselbegriffe, in FEsTS HRIFT FOR RUDOLF WASSERMANN 279, 280 (C. Broda ed. 1985)
(emphasizing the use of the word "protect" in article 1).
45 Compare GG art. 5, abs. 1, and id. art. 12, abs. 1, with US. CONsT. amend. I.
46 See Denninger, supra note 35, at 261; Schneider, supra note 35, at 33.
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friends were not modern social democrats. Neither the peculiar
language of the German provisions nor the historical context of
their adoption, however, was the deciding factor in the opinions;4 7
and in any event the contrast between Judge Posner's view and
that of the German court is striking enough to suggest the desira-
bility of taking a closer look at our own decisions.
II. AMERICAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
1. Goldberg v. Kelly. In this first of the so-called "new prop-
erty" cases, the Court held that due process forbade the termina-
tion of welfare benefits in advance of certain procedures, where
state law had granted an "entitlement" to qualified persons.48 Here
is arguably an affirmative obligation of sorts: that the state may
not stop paying means it must pay.
The scope of this "affirmative" obligation is obviously limited.
First, the focus was entirely on procedure; nothing in the decision
suggests that the state was required to go on providing welfare to
the individual involved after making appropriate findings in a suit-
able proceeding. Moreover, there was nothing to suggest the state
was required to create a welfare program to begin with, or even
that it was forbidden to abolish a pre-existing program. Indeed in
such a case as Goldberg the classification of the duty as affirmative
is somewhat artificial: it is equally accurate to say, as the Court
said, that the state was attempting to deprive the plaintiff of her
preexisting right to payments in the most traditional sense.49
2. Remedies for Governmental Wrongs. In Ex parte Young 0
the Supreme Court held, among other things, that a provision im-
posing fines so high as to discourage violating a law in order to test
its validity worked a deprivation of property without due process
of law.51 This and other decisions suggest there are times when the
Constitution requires the state to provide a judicial remedy; and
47 Indeed some of the German decisions have attracted sharp criticism in their own
country on the ground that the omission of a list of participatory rights such as that found
in the Weimar Constitution forbade interpreting the basic rights to have the same effect.
See, e.g., K. HEssE, supra note 35, at 123-24; cf. Forsthoff, Begriff und Wesen des sozialen
Rechtsstaates, in 12 VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS-
LEHRER 8, 23-27 (1954) (arguing that the social-state principle was not originally understood
to have created enforceable individual rights).
48 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
'9 Id. at 262 ("[Welfare] benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons
qualified to receive them. Their termination involves state action that adjudicates important
rights.").
60 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
51 Id. at 147.
[53:864
Positive and Negative Rights
this may be described as an affirmative duty of government toward
the citizen.2
This description, however, entails looking only at a part of the
transaction. Ex parte Young was not a case in which the state was
required to remedy a deficiency attributable to impersonal forces
or to someone else, as in the German cases. There was no doubt
that the government had stepped forward aggressively to intervene
in the life of the citizen: it had made it a crime to charge more
than a specified rate for rail transportation. On John Marshall's
thesis that constitutional rights are empty without courts to en-
force them,53 governments may well be under some affirmative ob-
ligation to provide judicial remedies for their own violations of the
Constitution. But cases like Young stand for no more than the
modest proposition that this limited duty is indispensable to the
traditional protection of the citizen against active governmental
aggression."
3. The Right to Counsel and Prisoners' Rights. The sixth
amendment provides that one prosecuted for a crime "shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. ' 55
This looks like just another right to be left alone: the government
may not prevent a criminal defendant from having a lawyer. Yet
the Court has long held that it imposes an affirmative duty on the
government to provide legal assistance if the defendant cannot af-
ford it. 56
Is this an opening wedge for a general recognition of affirma-
tive government duties in apparently defensive provisions? I think
not. In the first place, the language of other provisions is not the
same. The due process clauses explicitly require government depri-
vation, the first amendment requires government abridgement; the
52 Cf. Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 24 (1920) ("As the payment was not volun-
tary, ... no statutory authority was essential to enable or require the county to refund the
money.. . . To say that the county could collect these unlawful taxes by coercive means and
not incur any obligation to pay them back is nothing short of saying that it could take or
appropriate the property ... without due process of law."); General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209
U.S. 211 (1908) (in holding a state court could not dismiss a suit to enjoin an officer from
enforcing an unconstitutional law on sovereign-immunity grounds, the Court stated, "If a
suit against state officers ... may be forbidden by a State to its courts,. . . an easy way is
open to prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution").
82 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).
Even Judge Posner recognizes that a state may take upon itself an affirmative duty
of protection when it places an individual in a "position of danger." See Jackson v. City of
Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1983); Bowers v. DeVito,
686 F.2d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
56 U.S. CONST. amend. Vi.
56 See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
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"right" to assistance of counsel is not so negatively phrased.5 7
More important, as in the case of remedies for governmental ag-
gression in Ex parte Young, to characterize the right to assigned
counsel as involving an affirmative government duty is to look at
only a part of the transaction. In convicting an individual of crime,
the government reaches out to deprive him of life, liberty, or prop-
erty by execution, jail, or fine. 8
Thus, even in holding that the fourteenth amendment re-
quired the states to provide assigned counsel as well, the Court did
not expand the definition of deprivation to encompass the failure
to provide services; it merely determined what constituted the pro-
cess due when the state sought actively to deprive the individual of
life, liberty, or property by means of the criminal law e.5  This can
also be said of decisions imposing ostensibly "affirmative" duties to
provide medical care,60 law books,61 or even religious services62 to
persons in prison or otherwise disabled by government from ob-
taining them for themselves: 3 by locking an individual up without
providing such services, the government has deprived him of them
in the most traditional sense.
4. Contract Clause Cases. From th. very beginning, the Su-
preme Court has insisted that a state might impair the obligation
of contract in violation of article I, section 10 if it deprived the
57 The right to counsel also appears in tandem with other "rights," such as those to
compulsory process and a jury trial, which unmistakably require affirmative action in this
sense. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
58 Cf. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 374 (noting that it is often difficult to
distinguish between action and inaction, the authors write: "Failure to blow a whistle or to
shut off steam, although in itself inaction, is readily treated as negligent operation of a train,
which is affirmative misconduct").
5, See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963); cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. at 463 ("The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceed-
ings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or
waives the assistance of counsel.").
'1 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (prison officials violate the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" when they show "deliberate in-
difference" to a prisoner's serious medical needs).
61 See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (prisoner's constitutional right of
access to the courts requires prisons to furnish a law library); accord Younger v. Gilmore,
404 U.S. 15 (1971).
8 See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (finding a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 when the prisoner alleged deprivation of a "reasonable opportunity of pursuing his
[Buddhist] faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to
conventional religious precepts").
13 See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that a mentally retarded
person involuntarily confined in a state institution has substantive rights under the due
process clause).
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parties of pre-existing remedies for breach. 4 When a state's own
contracts were involved, this conclusion might be viewed as merely
another example of the Ex parte Young principle that there must
be a remedy for government aggression. But the rule was un-
hesitatingly applied to purely private contracts in cases like Bron-
son v. Kinzie,"5 where the Court held that a state could not destroy
a mortgagee's foreclosure rights by denying him an effective
remedy.
This decision is a more serious challenge to Judge Posner's
thesis than those we have previously considered, for in Bronson
the Supreme Court unequivocally interpreted a provision forbid-
ding government intrusion to require the government to protect
the citizen against a third party. Moreover, the Court's logic was
compelling. If the state were free to withdraw remedies, it could
effectively impair the substantive obligation;66 for at least as early
as Hobbes it had been recognized that a contractual right was
worthless without state coercion.6 7
One must not overgeneralize from this example. Ogden v.
Saunders68 made clear that it is only withdrawal of a previously
existing right that offends the contract clause: there is no general
obligation to protect contractual expectations, but there is an obli-
gation to continue providing the protection originally afforded.'
Moreover, other clauses must be individually examined to see
whether even this degree of state protection against third parties is
indispensable to their functioning; not every clause expressly for-
bids the state to impair the rights of one citizen against another.
Finally, the contract clause cases entailed government protection
only against third parties, not against natural adversity. Indeed the
very fact that the rights protected are those held against third par-
ties, which justifies the limited affirmative obligation the Court
found implicit in that clause, seems to forbid extending the prece-
dents to hold that it also requires government protection against
poverty or disease.
64 See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
" 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 320 (1843).
,c The Court stated, "[N]o one, we presume, would say that there is any substantial
difference between a retrospective law declaring a particular contract or class of contracts to
be abrogated and void, and one which took away all remedy to enforce them, or encumbered
it with conditions that rendered it useless or impracticable to pursue it." Id. at 317.
'7 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIV (2d ed. London 1924) (1st ed. 1651).
48 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
" Id. at 321-22.
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5. The Labor Injunction. In Truax v. Corrigan,7" in 1921, the
Supreme Court held that a state could not constitutionally forbid
injunctions against picketing by striking workers. One of the
grounds relied on was that by withdrawing the injunctive remedy
the state had deprived the employer of property without due pro-
cess of law.71 Free access to his premises was a part of the right to
land; picketing interfered with that right; and "[a] law which oper-
ates to make lawful such a wrong . . . deprives the owner of the
business and the premises of his property without due process. '72
Here is another example of an affirmative governmental duty:
although it would have been easy to conclude as a linguistic matter
that it was the picketers and not the state that had "deprived" the
employer of his property, the Court interpreted the due process
clause, despite its negative wording, to require the state to protect
the employer against the acts of private parties. 73
Once the Supreme Court had rejected the plausible historical
argument that the due process clauses were meant only to assure
an appropriate procedure in criminal cases, 4 the logic of the Truax
argument is strong. Property, like contract, entails a right against
third parties that is worthless without government help. That it
might suffice for the state to allow the householder to shoot bur-
glars proves only that the state may have a broad range of choice
among means of meeting its obligation, for the right of self-help
would be no better than no property at all if the burglar were not
legally disabled from fighting back.7 5 The state's obligation not to
70 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
"' Id. at 328. Alternatively, the Court held that even if the statute withheld from the
employer only the injunctive remedy, and not all other remedies, the statute failed as a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment insofar as it operated
only against employers as a class. Id. at 334.
7 Id. at 327-28.
73 Cf. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (in upholding
a limitation on federal jurisdiction to enforce claims under a retroactively repealed interpre-
tation of the Fair Labor Standards Act only because the repeal was not itself unconstitu-
tional, the Court stated, "[W]hile Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and
restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that
power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to
take private property without just compensation.").
74 See, e.g., Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in
the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4 HARV.
L. REv. 365 (1891).
71 Locke's description of the social compact suggests that government has assumed the
affirmative obligation to afford greater protection than the individual enjoyed in a state of
nature, not that it can absolve itself of responsibility by restoring the law of the jungle:
But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty and execu-
tive power they had in the state of nature into the hands of society, . . . yet it being
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deprive the owner of his property may thus, by analogy to the con-
tract clause, implicitly include the duty not to withdraw pre-ex-
isting remedies against third parties.7"
From Truax it may not be a giant step to the critical and at
first glance startling conclusion of the German court in the abor-
tion case that the government must affirmatively protect life as
well. It is true that the argument that made Truax and the con-
tract cases so compelling is weaker here. Unlike contract and prop-
erty, life is not a legal construct whose only significance lies in pro-
tection against other human beings; to limit deprivations of life to
direct government aggression would not drain the provision of its
meaning. Yet it is hard to believe that the framers meant to re-
quire that theft and not murder be made a crime. Moreover, the
social-contract theory that so pervaded early American political
thought entails a surrender of the right of self-help in exchange for
government protection not only of property but of life and liberty
as well.77 If the due process clauses embody this vision, it may not
be amiss to conclude that they do so entirely and thus also require
affirmative government protection of life and liberty.78
Once freed from the constraint of finding a right that would be
meaningless without an obligation to protect against third parties,
moreover, a court might be tempted to conclude that a government
that deprives people of life by not punishing murder also does so
by declining to feed the hungry or to rescue fire victims,
and-contrary to Judge Posner's view-we would have discovered
only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and prop-
erty,. . . the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, .. is obliged to
secure every one's property ...."
JOHN LocK, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. IX (T. Peardon ed. 1952) (1st ed.
1690).
76 If this argument is accepted, it means only that a threshold requirement for the ap-
plication of the clause has been met; it does not compel the Court's conclusion that the
abolition of the injunctive remedy constituted a deprivation of property without due process
of law. For discussion of the remaining issues in Truax see Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: 1921-30, 1986 DuKR L.J. 65, 71-76.
77 Indeed, Locke used the term "property" as a catch-all phrase for the interests of life,
liberty, and property, and contended the people entered into civil society in order to pre-
serve each of these interests. See J. Lo
78 Thus it may have been not inattentiveness to the state-action requirement, but
rather a broad conception of official deprivation that induced Justice Blackmun to suggest
that if the fetus were considered a person it might be unconstitutional for a state to permit
abortion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 n.54 (1973). For an argument that even if the
unborn child is considered a person, no constitutional deprivation occurs when a private
physician performs the abortion, see Epstein, Substantive Due Process by any Other Name:
The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159, 179-80.
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a constitutional right to basic welfare services .7
The greatest weakness of this logical step is that it is pro-
foundly ahistorical. The night-watchman theory of government
may have been in sufficient disrepute by 1949, the year the Basic
Law was adopted, to make it plausible for the German court to
equate failure to protect against impersonal forces with failure to
protect against third parties, but it was otherwise when the due
process clauses were written. It is true in Locke's terms that Jean
Valjean gave up the power to steal that precious loaf of bread as
well as the power to- punish those who trespassed against him; but
Locke might have denied he had had the "right" to steal in a state
of nature. s0 And it seems fair to conclude that Chief Justice Taft,
author of the Truax opinion, would have been among the last to
believe that by that decision he had laid the foundation for a con-
stitutional right to the provision of welfare.
6. The Public Forum Cases. In a series of decisions over the
past half century, the Supreme Court has developed the principle
that government may not forbid the use of certain public property
by private persons for purposes of free expression. Some of these
decisions can be explained on the ground of simple discrimination
and therefore, for purposes of this inquiry, add nothing to the
equal protection cases to be discussed below."" Others invoking the
7' To extract this conclusion from the Court's short-lived position that Congress could
not impose minimum wage requirements on state governments engaged in the provision of
essential services, however, see Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations
of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977) (finding in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), the basis for recognition of an affirma-
tive right to basic government services, including welfare); Tribe, Unraveling National
League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government
Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1977) (same), is fanciful to the extent it is not facetious; it
transforms a decision designed as a shield for state autonomy into a sword for its
destruction.
so Locke wrote, "The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges
every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches ... that, being all equal and independent,
no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions." J. LocKs, supra
note 75, at 5. This suggests that, even in the state of nature, one may not steal in order to
avoid starvation. Some ambiguity is present, however, in Locke's further statement that,
"when his own preservation comes not in competition," one ought "as much as he can, to
preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice to an offender, take
away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health,
limb, or goods of another." Id. at 6. "Preservation" here might mean self-defense, or it
might include the necessity to avoid starvation.
For example, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), where the defend-
ant's insufficiently harmful statements had been singled out for prosecution under a breach-
of-the-peace ordinance. Although the Court did not explicitly base its decision on the pres-
ence of discrimination, its rhetoric sounded in equal protection:
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absence of standards to limit administrative discretion may be ex-
plained as prophylactic decisions to guard against the risk of unde-
tected inequality and thus are similarly unhelpful.2 But neither of
these explanations applies to a case like Schneider v. State,83
where the Court held that certain municipalities had abridged
freedom of expression by impartially forbidding everyone to dis-
tribute handbills on streets and sidewalks. 4
In form the state was a traditional aggressor in Schneider. It
had forbidden private action, and it had sought to deprive the vio-
lators of their liberty or property as punishment. Perhaps that is
why the Court had no great difficulty in concluding that the state
had abridged the freedom of speech. But in substance what the
state had done was to refuse to make its property available to the
public to facilitate private expression-just as by outlawing theft
from the treasury a state reinforces its decision not to make addi-
tional contributions to alleviate the misery of the poor. 5
It is true that, as in the contract and property cases, the ar-
guably affirmative duty to make public property available for
speaking is a conditional one. It arises only after the government
has made an initial decision to devote the property to certain uses,
for not all public property has been held to be a public forum.8 In
contrast to the contract and property cases, however, the duty is
one of protection against impersonal influences such as the limited
availability of funds, not against the actions of third parties. In any
event, the fact that the public forum doctrine has been based in
substantial part upon an understanding of the role that streets and
In the realm of religious faith. . . sharp differences arise.. .. [T]he tenets of one man
may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. . . . But the people of this nation have
ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses,
these liberties are. . . essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of
the citizens of a democracy.
Id. at 310.
81 See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557 (1965) (stressing the risk of selective
enforcement under a standardless permit requirement).
ss 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
84 For the texts of the ordinances, see id. at 154-57. One of the challenged municipal
ordinances allowed the distribution of literature, but only after a permit had been obtained
from the local authorities. The Court struck this provision down on the grounds that it gave
the authorities discretion to choose which ideas could be disseminated. Id. at 164.
86 It does not seem helpful to explain that streets and parks are the property of the
people themselves and not of the state. If that is anything more than a restatement of the
conclusion, it leaves out of sight the fact that the state holds public moneys, too, only as a
trustee for the people.
86 See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966) (upholding a conviction for tres-
pass on jail premises because "jails, built for security purposes," are not traditionally open
to the public).
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parks have traditionally played in the struggle for free speech,87
together with the formally aggressive nature of the government ac-
tions taken in these cases, should inhibit extension of the public-
forum precedents to other liberties that might be found equally
important and equally dependent upon government aid for their
realization.
III. EQUAL PROTE
1. The Original Understanding. The equal protection clause
is regarded today as a general prohibition of discriminatory state
action that largely functions, like most of our constitutional provi-
sions, to prohibit active governmental aggression. The state may
not, for example, forbid eighteen-year-old men to drink if it does
not impose the same disability on eighteen-year-old women.88 Both
the language and the history of the clause, however, suggest that it
may have had an original purpose that is more relevant to the pre-
sent inquiry.
As Justice Miller noted in his opinion for the Court in the
Slaughter-House Cases,8 9 the southern states had not only enacted
Black Codes denying blacks a number of privileges and immuni-
ties; they had also, by failing to protect blacks against the depreda-
tions of others, left them "at the mercy of bad men."9 The 1866
Civil Rights Act addressed both of these problems, providing not
only that blacks should enjoy equal contractual and other rights
and be subject to no special penalties, but also that citizens of all
races should be entitled to the "full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is en-
joyed by white citizens.""1 In other words, if the state uses its crim-
inal and tort laws to protect whites from other people, it must do
the same for blacks.
The major impetus behind the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, according to the overwhelming testimony of members
of Congress who voted to propose it, was to provide an unshakable
constitutional base for these provisions. The language of the
amendment, moreover, was admirably designed to do just that.
The privileges or immunities clause seems to extend the nondis-
crimination principle of article IV respecting such matters as con-
8" See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion by Justice Roberts).
88 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
8 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
"Id. at 70.
91 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
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tractual capacity and criminal penalties to a state's own citizens,
without regard to race; the equal protection clause appears to re-
quire the states to afford blacks the same protection against others
as they afford whites.2
The Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the privileges
or immunities clause9" has induced it to read the equal protection
clause to absorb the function of protection against discrimination
in the distribution of rights and penalties. But the Court has never
denied that the equal protection clause also serves its original
function of requiring the state to protect blacks against third par-
ties to the extent it protects whites. It is true that, so far as this
clause is concerned, a state could theoretically avoid any affirma-
tive obligation by refusing altogether to forbid murder or theft.
Since that is hardly a realistic possibility, however, tying the rights
of the minority to those of the dominant group seems the practical
equivalent of creating an affirmative duty of protection, and even
in theory it sometimes imposes a duty of affirmative government
action.
2. Equality in the Provision of Other Services. In Shapiro v.
Thompson94 the Court held it unconstitutional to exclude individ-
uals from participation in a welfare program on the ground that
they had not yet lived in the state for a year. The basis was equal
protection: there was no sufficient justification for distinguishing
between old and new residents for this purpose. 5
Again there was no suggestion that, as would presumably be
decided in Germany, the state was under any obligation to provide
welfare benefits to anyone in the first place. The only requirement
being equality, in theory the state could have corrected the consti-
tutional flaw by abolishing its entire welfare program. Neverthe-
less, Shapiro confirms in the context of governmental services gen-
erally the conditional affirmative duty already discussed in
connection with protection against third parties: if government un-
dertakes to help A, it may have to help B as well. Its duty will
depend, of course, upon whether the Court finds A and B to be
similarly situated; and the Court will not always scrutinize the dis-
,' For a discussion of the history of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment and
this theory of its structure, see D. CURRIE, supra note 9, at 345-51, and the authorities cited
therein.
'3 See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74-78 (1873); D. CURRIE,
supra note 9, at 342-51 (discussing the Court's treatment of the clause).
4 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
,5 Id. at 627. The Court also invoked the due process clause of the fifth amendment to
hold unconstitutional a similar requirement adopted by Congress. Id. at 642.
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tinction as strictly as it did in Shapiro, where it found discrimina-
tion against those exercising a constitutional right to travel.9 6
When a violation is found, however, the practical effect may often
be the same as if there were an absolute duty to provide services,
for in the modern world it is almost as unthinkable for a state to
abandon welfare payments as to stop punishing crime.
3. The Meaning of Equality. I have dismissed some of the
decisions involving the assignment of counsel as adding little to the
concept of positive rights against the government. Another right-
to-counsel case, however, is among several equal protection deci-
sions suggesting a more sweeping theory of affirmative governmen-
tal obligations.
In Douglas v. California,97 in 1963, the Court invoked not the
right to counsel or due process but equal protection to hold that a
state must provide counsel to represent an indigent on appeal."" In
so holding, the Court relied upon Griffin v. Illinois,9 which had
required the state to furnish an indigent with a free transcript of
the trial: "In criminal trials," wrote Justice Black in Griffin, for a
plurality whose views became those of the majority in Douglas, "a
State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on ac-
count of religion, race, or color." 100 A similar argument informed
the Court's decision in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections"1 '
that equal protection forbade the state to make payment of a poll
tax a condition of voting: "Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not
germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral
process.1
02
In neither Griffin nor Douglas was there any doubt that the
state was depriving the defendants of life, liberty, or property in
the traditional sense; as in the other right-to-counsel cases, the
state was seeking the imposition of criminal penalties. Thus again,
the narrow holdings entail no more than a definition of how the
government must proceed when it acts aggressively against the in-
dividual. 10 3 The same may be true of Harper, where the state had
96 Id. at 629-31 (noting the historical importance of the right to travel).
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
98 Id. at 357-58.
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
100 Id. at 17.
101 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
102 Id. at 668.
103 The Court emphasized this aspect of the matter in its most recent foray into this
field, holding that due process required a state to furnish psychiatric assistance to an indi-
gent criminal defendant whose sanity at the time of the offense is in question: "[W]hen a
State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it
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attempted to prevent the citizen from exercising the privilege of
voting-which can hardly be viewed as the provision of an affirma-
tive governmental service. What is of interest is the reasoning that
led the Court to these results, for it embodies a concept of equality
that could require affirmative governmental action in a much
broader range of situations.
Justice Harlan put his finger on the crucial point in dissents in
both Douglas and Griffin. In neither case had the state explicitly
drawn a distinction based on wealth. In one sense it had treated
everyone identically: everyone was entitled to counsel and a tran-
script on appeal, but only at his own expense. If some people could
not afford them, that was not the state's fault: "All that Illinois has
done is to fail to alleviate the consequences of differences in eco-
nomic circumstances that exist wholly apart from any state action.
The Court thus holds that . . . the Equal Protection clause im-
poses on the States an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flow-
ing from differences in economic circumstances. '" 104
This concept of equality has potential consequences far be-
yond the limited context of criminal proceedings in which the gov-
ernment seeks to deprive the individual of life, liberty, or property.
It seems equally applicable to the distribution of government ser-
vices; as Justice Harlan suggested, the same principle would re-
quire a state to charge the poor less than the rich for water or for
graduate education, since all uniform charges bear more heavily on
the poor than they do on others.1 05 Equality would be judged, in
other words, not by the action of the state but by its effect on the
individual; and whenever the government acted it would have to
compensate for inequalities of wealth for which it was not
responsible.10 6
must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense,"
stressing that in the criminal proceeding "his liberty is at stake." Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S.
Ct. 1087, 1093 (1985). Similarly, in basing the invalidation of a filing fee for divorce actions
on due process rather than equal protection in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971),
Justice Harlan noted that by monopolizing the means for legally dissolving the marriage
relationship and charging a filing fee the state had actively deprived the poor of the right to
end marriages. Id. at 380-81. The "affirmative" obligation to provide a forum arose only
because the state had imposed duties on the individual that could be terminated only by
judicial action. Id. at 376.
'1 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Douglas, 372 U.S. at 362
,(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The State may have a moral obligation to eliminate the evils of
poverty, but it is not required by the Equal Protection Clause to give to some whatever
others can afford.").
:05 Douglas, 372 U.S. at 361-62.
0o In the German cases there is a strong strain of this theory of equality. In one case,
for example, the German court invalidated on equality grounds a provision that made all
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Even if this proposition and all of its implications were ac-
cepted, it would not be the equivalent of a general command to
eradicate differences in wealth, since like other applications of
equal protection it presupposes some government action. More-
over, the Court has shown no inclination to extend the principle
beyond cases in which the government has acted intrusively,
though that fact seems irrelevant to the theory.1 0 7 Nevertheless,
cases like Douglas, Griffin, and Harper suggest once again that the
Court is sometimes willing to find in negatively phrased constitu-
tional provisions some form of affirmative government obligation.
4. Extension of the State Action Concept. In Shelley v.
Kraemer,10 8 the Court prohibited the state from enforcing a ra-
cially restrictive covenant as it would enforce any other covenant.
In so doing, the Court made it clear that state neutrality was not
always enough to satisfy the equal protection clause; if the state
acted at all, it had to take sides against private discrimination.10 9
Since there was no doubt the state was using its coercive powers
against the defendant, this case too involved typical state aggres-
sion. Like the theory of equality employed in Douglas and Griffin,
however, Shelley's concept of state responsibility had implications
not limited to that type of case.
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, ° for example,
the state was held responsible for discrimination by a private firm
campaign contributions deductible from income taxes, on the ground that they benefited
wealthy taxpayers more than others and therefore worked to the practical advantage of the
more conservative party. In the same spirit, the court added a dictum that equality required
that taxes be progressive. BVerfG 8, 51, 68 (1958). It need hardly be added that it would be
difficult to attribute any such notion of equality to the framers of the fourteenth
amendment.
107 Indeed, the general principle that one must look to the effects rather than the basis
of government action to determine whether or not it offends the equal protection clause has
received important setbacks in the area of so-called de facto discrimination in hiring. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (denying that the Court's decisions have
"embraced the proposition that a law . . . , without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact") (emphasis in original).
108 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
109 The Court stated that the fourteenth amendment is not "ineffective simply because
the.., discrimination, which the State has enforced, was defined initially by the terms of a
private agreement.. . . [Wihen the effect of [state] action is to deny rights subject to the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of this Court to enforce the
constitutional commands." Id. at 20. It is interesting to note, in light of the above discussion
of the contract and property cases, that the Court gave short shrift to the argument that
property owners had a right of access to the courts for a remedy: "The Constitution confers
upon no individual the right to demand action by the State which results in the denial of
equal protection of the laws to other individuals." Id. at 22.
110 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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that had leased state property. 1 Again there was no doubt that
the state had taken action in entering the lease; but, as in Shelley,
it was not the state that had decided to discriminate. The decision
may be said to have placed an affirmative burden on the state, if it
leases at all, to forbid discrimination by its private lessees.'
Reitman v. Mulkey"'5 may have gone even further. There the
Court prohibited the state from enacting a constitutional provision
forbidding the adoption of fair-housing laws.' 14 In Reitman, the
state had not implicated itself in the decision to discriminate ei-
ther by enforcing a private decision, as in Shelley, or by making its
property available to the discriminator, as in Burton. What the
state had done, however, was to stop forbidding private discrimina-
tion with which it had no active connection.
There were those who defended the decision flatly on the
ground that the state had an affirmative duty to prevent private
discrimination." 5 Such a conclusion would effectively overrule the
Civil Rights Cases16 and leave the fourteenth amendment's ex-
plicit state-action limitation without meaning. It would also be the
most far-reaching example we have encountered of an affirmative
state duty to help the individual.
Later cases like Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis"7 and Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,"" however, have shown that the Court
is not prepared to take the principle so far. Moreover, the Court in
Reitman itself expressly disclaimed any intention of imposing on
the state a duty to prevent private discrimination, suggesting in-
stead that the state could have simply repealed the fair-housing
'" Id. at 725.
, More particularly, Burton stands for the principle that a state which enters into a
"symbiotic relationship" with a private individual or entity, each conferring mutual benefits
on the other, may be held responsible for the private party's discriminatory conduct.
Whether the state and the private party have such a relationship depends upon the particu-
lar circumstances of the case. Id. at 724-25.
113 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
114 Id. at 381.
115 See, e.g., Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal
Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39, 57.
116 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
' 407 U.S. 163 (1972). In Moose Lodge, the Court held that the refusal of a private
club to allow black guests did not violate the fourteenth amendment even where the club
was licensed and regulated by the state. Id. at 177. The Court refused to hold that the
presence of any connection between the private entity and the state was sufficient to con-
vert the private entity's conduct into state action, noting that this would "utterly emascu-
late" the state action requirement. Id. at 173.
211 419 U.S. 345 (1974). In Jackson, the Court held that a public utility's termination
of electric service without a hearing did not violate due process because the heavily regu-
lated and monopolistic utility was not a "state actor." Id. at 358.
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laws without running afoul of the Constitution.1 9 The Court em-
phasized that by enshrining the right to discriminate in its consti-
tution the state had rendered it "immune from legislative, execu-
tive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state government.' 120
Though the significance of this fact was not spelled out in the
Reitman opinion, subsequent decisions suggest the Court may
have meant that by erecting unusual barriers to the enactment of
fair-housing laws the state had discriminated against the benefi-
ciaries of such laws in a much more traditional sense.' 2' Neverthe-
less, there remain suggestions of limited affirmative duties in mod-
ern state-action cases, where the state has taken any action at all.
CONCLUSION
Judge Posner's position that "the Constitution is a charter of
negative rather than positive liberties"'2 2 has great intuitive ap-
peal. It finds support in the constitutional language, in Supreme
Court decisions, and in the history of the Bill of Rights as a safe-
guard against governmental intrusion. My survey of the cases
leaves me convinced, as Judge Posner implies, that in this country
government need not actively support everything it may not for-
bid. The contrast with the German decisions remains striking.
I think, however, that this survey has shown Judge Posner's
proposition must be applied with caution. From the beginning
there have been cases. in which the Supreme Court, sometimes very
persuasively, has found in negatively phrased provisions constitu-
tional duties that can in some sense be described as positive. When
government acts to deprive the citizen of life, liberty, or property,
for example, it may have to furnish a judicial remedy to test the
legality of its action as well as legal services and materials to en-
:1 387 U.S. at 376.
2o Id. at 377. This kind of invulnerability from attack was held to "involve the State in
private discrimination to an unconstitutional degree." Id. at 378-79; see also id. at 376 (not-
ing that the court below, whose arguments the Justices seemed to endorse, had conceded
that the state was not required to outlaw private discrimination).
121 See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969) (automatic referendum require-
ment applicable only to fair-housing ordinances held invalid as placing a "special burden"
on minorities); Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 485-86 n.29 (1982) (a
"state's race-conscious restructuring of its decisionmaking process" in order to prevent a
school district from ordering busing is "impermissible"). For commentary explainingReit-
man on this basis, see Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 82 (1967), and Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality,
and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REv. 41, 50.
122 Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir.) (discussed supra note 1 and
accompanying text), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1983).
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able the indigent object of its action to defend. When government
has disabled the individual from obtaining his own medical or reli-
gious services by incarcerating him, it may have to provide them.
When government protects some people either from third parties
or from impersonal hardships, it may have to protect others as
well. When government takes action that facilitates private dis-
crimination, it may have to outlaw private action. When it decides
to maintain a street or a park, it may have to make the property,
available as a public forum. Once it provides remedies for the pro-
tection of private contract or property rights, it may have to con-
tinue affording them.
The cases suggest that some clauses are more likely to be in-
terpreted to have "positive" components than others. The contract
and property provisions seem particularly susceptible to such in-
terpretation, because they plainly forbid government to interfere
with rights against private parties the value of which is largely de-
pendent upon government protection. The obligation to provide
government property for the exercise of constitutional rights is es-
pecially strong in the speech context for historical reasons and es-
pecially weak in that of religion because of the countervailing force
of the establishment clause.
Moreover, within a single clause the discovery of one "affirma-
tive" duty does not necessarily compel the discovery of another.
The contract clause requires some protection against third parties,
but none against the elements. Freedom of speech may require the
state to open its parks but not its treasury. Equal protection by its
terms imposes only the conditional duty to help one person to the
extent the government helps another who is similarly situated.
One should not quibble over the question whether the rights
acknowledged in these cases are in some linguistic or logical sense
"really" positive. What is important is that one not take Judge
Posner's valuable insight as a talisman capable of resolving a broad
spectrum of problems against the existence of governmental duties
that can in some sense be deemed affirmative. In other words, it
would be dangerous to read too much, even at the theoretical level,
into the generally valid principle that ours, unlike the German, is a
Constitution of negative rather than positive liberties.
At the practical level the distinction may be of even less sig-
nificance. On the one hand, the unlikelihood that such affirmative
services as welfare payments and criminal laws will be abandoned
may make our traditional equal protection principle the practical
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equivalent in many cases of an absolute duty to provide them. 23
On the other hand, despite their rhetoric, all of the German deci-
sions involve areas in which there has been an effective govern-
ment monopoly: broadcasting, higher education, and the use of
force. In each case one might plausibly have argued that govern-
ment action had made it impossible for the individual effectively
to exercise a constitutional right without government assistance. 24
And if that is so, in their results the German decisions are essen-
tially of a piece with our courts' unsurprising and traditional con-
clusion that a state must provide medical care to those it has
imprisoned.1 25
Equally informative, moreover, is the degree of restraint the
German court has exercised in determining the scope of such af-
firmative duties as it has discovered. Only in the abortion and tele-
vision cases has that court so far found the government's affirma-
tive action wanting. In other cases, while enunciating a general
governmental duty, it has emphasized the government's broad dis-
cretion in determining how much money to invest in educational
facilities, or how to protect against terrorism, or how to resolve
competing interests in environmental disputes."2" To a very sub-
stantial extent the degree of affirmative obligation that exists
seems to depend not on the reigning theory but on the degree of
aggressiveness or deference with which the courts apply it.127
2I See, for example, the equal-protection arguments made in connection with abortion
funding, discussed supra note 13.
124 See Denninger, supra note 35, at 261 (finding the argument for affirmative rights at
its strongest "when the state, as in higher education, disposes of the prerequisites to the
effectuation of a fundamental right in effectively monopolistic fashion") (author's
translation).
125 Thus the affirmative duties imposed on the German government in the television
cases, discussed supra at notes 37-40 and accompanying text, might have been justified in
traditional American terms on the ground that by requiring broadcast licenses and limiting
their number the government had actively abridged the freedom of nonlicensees to commu-
nicate over the air. Cf. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-121 (1973) (reserv-
ing the issue of state action in a suit seeking to impose affirmative duties on broadcasters
under the first amendment); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) (holding
that the state's restriction of the number of liquor licenses available in a given community
did not implicate the state in the discriminatory policies of the private club to which it had
granted a license).
126 Even in the abortion field the practical differences are far smaller than one might
have imagined: a general escape formula allowing abortions in casis where "socially" indi-
cated softens the German situation to one perhaps not so distant from our own. See BVerfG
39, 50 (1975).
127 One is tempted to suggest, indeed, that the more general and abstract a legal theory
is the less likely it is to be of much utility in resolving actual cases. Cf. Associated Indus. v.
Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973) (doubting that it made any practi-
cal difference whether regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
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Indeed there are observers who suggest that, practically speak-
ing, affirmative constitutional rights are inherently unlikely ever to
become much more than pious exhortations to the political
branches of government. In contrast to traditional defensive rights,
it is argued, rights to participate in the provision of government
services have such imprecise boundaries that their effectuation is
not to be expected without legislative and executive definition:
"For this reason social rights such as the right to protection of the
family, motherhood, and youth cannot be captured by an enforcea-
ble, abstract norm. ' 128 This conclusion is backed up by the obser-
vation that, notwithstanding the worldwide proliferation of consti-
tutional provisions explicitly imposing affirmative social duties,
"[n]o constitution recognizing the rule of law has yet actually suc-
ceeded in practice" in turning away from the classical negative un-
derstanding of fundamental rights. 129
Does this mean we must despair of achieving the altruistic so-
cial state to which the Germans aspire, the fraternitO for which, in
part, the French Revolution was fought? Not at all. As the same
author who argued for the futility of constitutionalizing social
rights observed, West Germany has to a large degree achieved its
aspiration, though not by the enforcement of positive constitu-
tional rights;5 0 and so have we. With a little help from the equal
protection clause, we have done so essentially by the means con-
templated by constitution-makers who chose not to enshrine social
rights: by political forces reflected in legislative and executive
action.
were reviewed under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard or the "substantial evidence"
rule); D. CURRIE, supra note 9, at 320-29 (describing how identical verbal formulas respect-
ing the meaning of the necessary and proper clause were used to achieve totally divergent
results by majority and dissenting opinions in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603
(1870) (invalidating paper tender)).
128 Forsthoff, supra note 47, at 11-12.
11 Id. at 20, 33 (discussing, inter alia, the French and German provisions noted supra
at notes 7, 20-47). Another humble example is article XI, § 2 of the 1970 Illinois Constitu-
tion, which bravely gives every person a "right to a healthful environment," enforceable
against "any party, governmental or private," and which has proved a dead letter.
There are special reasons why an effort to impose affirmative constitutional rights
would risk futility in the United States. The enforcement of affirmative duties upon the
Federal government would pose particular problems: the executive cannot be ordered to
spend money that Congress has not appropriated, and Congress cannot be ordered to make
an appropriation. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 6 ("for any Speech or Debate in either House,
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place"); id. § 9 ("[n]o
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law"); see also Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (holding
that the speech and debate clause prohibited an injunction against members of Congress).
110 Forsthoff, supra note 47.
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When liberty lives in the hearts of men, said Learned Hand,
no constitution is needed to preserve it; when it dies there, no con-
stitution can save it.131 I would not draw from this the conclusion
that we might as well dispense with constitutions, though the En-
glish have managed pretty well without one; I think we can point
to occasions on which a constitution has made a difference.13 2 But
there is enough truth in Hand's observation to make us think twice
about considering a set of positive constitutional rights as either a
necessary or a sufficient condition for the achievement of the social
state, and more than twice about the advisability of taking liberties
with the Constitution to find them.
131 LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE Spmrr OF LmERTY 189-90 (2d ed.
1954). As evidence in support of this thesis one might cite the conspicuous failure of the
first amendment to protect us against the Sedition Act, the excesses of Espionage Act prose-
cutions during and after the First World War, or McCarthyism.
132 Two recent examples in which judicial interpretations of the Constitution have pro-
foundly altered the practical situation are the reapportionment and abortion cases. E.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
